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INTRODUCTION

"Emigrate, automate, or evaporate" has been the industry mantra
of American manufacturing for well over a decade. For various reasons
principally high labor costs - manufacturing industries often must
struggle to remain profitable unless they move offshore. By and large,
this movement directs itself towards Asia. Yet there is another side
to the story: Mexico.
Like most of Asia, Mexico's labor costs are far below those in the
United States. Unlike Asia, Mexico is not separated from the world's
largest market by an ocean; Mexico sits next door. This situation,
where one country with plentiful and cheap labor bordered another
country with huge resources of technology and capital (and consumers
willing and able to purchase seemingly unlimited goods), gave birth
to a new industry, which became known as the "maquiladora" system.
Essentially, the maquiladora system allows American business to
buy cheap labor. Components for a product are manufactured in the
United States, and then shipped to Mexico. Once in Mexico, the parts
are assembled and then shipped back to the United States. As long
as nothing but assembly takes place in Mexico (and a few operations
considered incidental), the goods require no customs in Mexico, and
require only a duty on the value-added upon return to the United
States. The system has strong advocates and vehement critics in both
countries. Maquiladoras have either robbed American workers of employment and exploited the Mexicans, or they have preserved millions
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of American jobs and significantly contributed to the development of
Mexico; opinions on maquiladoras vary greatly. While there may be
debate over the value of maquiladoras, there is no doubt over their
economic impact. The system is extremely large, and it continues to
grow larger.
This article will examine the maquiladora system and its effects
upon the two countries. Then the focus will shift to the Yucatan
Peninsula, which so far has not heavily participated in maquiladoras.
Through a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages, both to
the United States and to Mexico, of establishing maquiladoras in the
Yucatan Peninsula, the realization becomes apparent that this issue
goes beyond economics and increasingly waxes political. Finally, the
discussion attempts to weigh the prospects of Yucatan industry, and
to formulate a practical appraisal of the chances for maquiladoras in
the region.

II.

THE MAQUILADORA SYSTEM

A.

History

For nearly as long as there has been a United States or a Mexico,
economic relations existed in some form between the two countries.
While Mexico does have many natural resources and some domestic
industry, the economic relationship - at least in the twentieth century
- is characterized mostly by Mexico supplying labor for U.S. industry., Historically, Mexicans headed north because their own country,
with its employment opportunities limited mainly to agriculture, simply could not supply enough jobs.2 Coupled with the lack of jobs was
3
a tremendous rise in Mexico's population, which continues to this day.

1.

Tarbox, An Investors' Introduction to Mexico's Maquiladora Program, 22 TEX. INT'L

L.J. 109 (1987).
2.

D. BAERRESEN, THE BORDER INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM OF MEXICO (1971).
S. SANDERS, MEXICO: CHAOS ON OUR DOORSTEP (1986). Mexico's population problems
are certainly no secret. Sanders summarizes them this way:
in 1910, Mexico had only 15 million people (the U.S. had 92 million). Between the
3.

end of World War II and 1970, the Mexican population, largely as a result of a
declining infant mortality rate, had doubled to 53 million. And by the early 1990s,
By the year 2000, Mexico will have at least 100
it will have doubled again ....

million people, perhaps as many as 112 million - and by some calculations, as
many as 132 million people . . . if population should rise above 126 million in the
year 2000, Mexico will move by mid-twenty-first century to a total population of
500 to 600 million. Today more than half of Mexico's population is under fifteen
years of age.
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Until the end of World War II, the United States could accommodate Mexican migrants. During World War II especially, Mexican
laborers were welcomed since they replaced the men who were off
fighting.4 Slowly, the situation changed. In 1951, the United States
Department of Immigration, in conjunction with Mexican authorities,
created the Bracero Program. 5 Under this program, Mexicans could
legally enter the United States as seasonal agricultural workers. 6 The
braceros were almost exclusively men, yet the program affected al
segments of Mexican society. Workers had their families move to cities
and towns in northern Mexico, just across the border from the source
of employment and not too far out of touch. Others came to northern
Mexico in hope of finding work in the Bracero Program, but arrived
too late and found the labor quotas full. For these and other causes,
northern Mexico experienced a huge surge in population during the
time of the Bracero Program.7
In 1964, the United States ended the Bracero Program. American
labor unions, particularly farm unions, had come to view the Mexicans
with suspicion and the Bracero Program with hostility. Union pressure
was the force behind cancellation of the program. 9 Whether union
fears of the Bracero Program were justified is arguable; whether repeal of the program was devastating to the Mexican economy is not.
In 1964, approximately 185,000 Mexicans were employed by the program, and in 1965 they were nearly all unemployed.' °
In response to the crisis in the northern part of the country, Mexico
formulated the Border Industrialization Program, which became
known as the maquiladora system, and launched the program in May
of 1966.11 Americans always had some degree of investment in Mexico,
and had located some processing and assembling in Mexico,12 but the
Border Industrialization Program was something new. The program
was specifically designed to attract labor intensive industries, and to

D. BAERRESEN, supra note 2, at 2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Tarbox, supra note 1, at 113.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. D. BAERRESEN, supra note 2, at 3. As to the origin of the word "maquiladora," it is
derived from the Spanish word maquila, which is the amount of corn framers pay a miller for
his services. See Tarbox, supra note 1, at 110.
12. D. BAERRESEN, supra note 2, at 3.
4.
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place them in that part of the country which was in turmoil after the
13
loss of the Bracero Program.
Under the original Border Industrialization Program, foreign investors were permitted to locate equipment and materials in "bonded
manufacturing zones" near the U.S. border. No customs duty was
charged on the equipment or materials, but rather, the foreign firms
posted a bond for the value of the imported capital.14 The investment
was limited to the northern border zone and to specified industries.
Foreign ownership of any project was limited to forty-nine percent. 15
Just as important as any of the Mexican regulations was a section of
the Tariff Schedule of the United States which charged only a valueadded duty on U.S. components assembled abroad and returned to
the United States.16
During the next two decades, maquiladoras experienced great success. From 57 plants and about 4,200 workers in 1966, the industry
grew to 300 plants and 30,000 workers in 1976.17 In 1972, the Mexican
authorities removed the geographic restrictions on maquiladoras, and
allowed them in any "economically depressed" area throughout the
country. Also, during the mid-1970s the Mexican government
simplified the restrictions on establishing and operating a maquiladora,
streamlined customs for the industry, and permitted total foreign own8
ership of most plants.1
The favorable government treatment, and the 1982 collapse of the
peso, created a thriving environment for maquiladoras. In 1986, the
program employed over 300,000 workers in more than 1,000 plants,
contributing more than $1.3 billion to Mexico's foreign exchange earnings.19 The main fields for maquiladoras have been electrical and electrical components, auto parts, household appliances, furniture, and
textiles.20 Maquiladoras have surpassed tourism to become Mexico's
second most important industry, behind oil.21
13. Id.
14. Tarbox, supra note 1, at 113.
15. Id.
16. United States International Trade Commission, Tariff Schedule of the United States,
items 800.00-807.00 (Schedule 8). For more on the U.S. law regulating these imports, see § C,
infra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
17. 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1462 (1986).
18. Baker, The Magnet of Growth in Mexico's North, Bus. WK. (Industrial/Technology
Edition), June 6, 1988, at 48.
19. 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 717 (1987).
20. The breakdown amongst the fields is as follows: electric and electronic goods, 44%;
textiles and apparel, 20%; furniture, 15%; transportation equipment, 12% (1987 figures). See 3
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1462 (1986).
'21. Schwartz, The Border IndustrializationProgramof Mexico, 4 Sw. J. Bus. & ECON.
1 (1987).
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The future of maquiladoras is likely to be as bright as its past.
Although it is true that the 1982 devaluation of the peso,2 and the
emergence of debt-equity swaps,2 led to unexpected and unusually
large growth, the underlying causes of the industry's success have
remained constant. Labor costs in Mexico are roughly one-seventh of
what they are in the U.S.;- the Mexican government supports the
program; transportation between the countries is generally inexpensive; and the United States still only charges a value-added duty on
components assembled abroad. As long as these four factors - labor
costs, transportation costs, Mexican governmental policy, and U.S.
customs policy - are favorably inclined, maquiladoras are bound to
flourish. Some experts have projected that by the year 2000,
maquiladoras will employ 3 million workers and provide Mexico nearly
m
$2.6 billion in foreign exchange.?
B.

Mexican Law

As mentioned earlier, the motivation behind the maquiladora program is to provide employment, attract technology, and secure industrialization and development which Mexico alone cannot finance. To
achieve those results, Mexico allows foreign investment, through the
maquiladora system, with much more relaxed supervision and regulation than under other forms of foreign investment. Even within the
program itself, the laws and regulations covering maquiladoras gradually have grown more simplified and less burdensome. Still, the foreign
investor approaching Mexico faces myriad laws, regulations, rules,
and directives. Certainly, no one should attempt to form a maquiladora
project without experienced counsel. While this discussion focuses
upon U.S. involvement in maquiladoras, and American presence does

22. The February 1982 and August 1982 peso devaluations tremendously affected both
Mexico and the American Southwest. For more on the continuing effects, see Harrel & Fischer,
The Mexican Peso Devaluationand BorderArea Employment, 6 Sw. J. Bus. & ECON. 19 (1989).
23. Observers argue over the exact impact which debt-equity swaps have had upon
maquiladoras, but this is an argument over the degree only; no one questions that there has
been an impact. Most feel that the impact was enormous. According to Robert Miller, First
Secretary and Commercial Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, almost every single
concern participating in maquiladoras was lured by a debt-equity swap. See 4 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1093 (1987).
24. deForest, A Manager's Guide to a Successful Maquiladora, Manufacturing Systems,
June, 1988, at 24.
25. Testimony of Joseph Spetrini, Deputy Assistant Commerce Secretary for Import Administration, before the U.S. House of Representative's Subcommittee on Government Operations,
reprinted in 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 790 (1987).
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dominate the program, it is important to recognize that participation
is open to any country. Mexico needs to finance its development with
foreign capital, and certainly doesn't mind investment from countries

other than the

U.S.26

When establishing the project, investors need to be conscious of
two important restrictions on maquiladora activity. First, Mexico prohibits foreign ownership of property within "Restricted Zones." The
regulations covering foreign investment define Restricted Zones as
"[a] one hundred kilometer wide strip of national territory running
along the borders, and a fifty kilometer wide strip running along the
beaches of the nation. "- If a foreign-owned maquiladora, or even one
with only partial foreign investment, needs land within this zone, then
it has two options. The enterprise may enter into a "trust agreement,"
a statutory arrangement where certified banks hold the land in trust
for the interest; the trust lasts thirty years, and may be renewed
once. 28 Alternatively, the enterprise may lease the property. Leases
last for a term of ten years and are renewable twice. 29 Both trusts
and leases may be renegotiated upon renewal, which certainly presents
an element of instability.
In addition to restrictions on where a maquiladora may locate,
there also are restrictions on what activities it can do. Unless an area
is specifically reserved for the Mexican government or its citizens, it
is open for foreign investment. 30 Some fields, while open to investment
26. See, e.g., Japan'sInvestment PenetratesDeeply in Latin America, EUROMONEY, Mar.,
1989, at 88:
Japan is the world's second largest buyer of Mexican products and has bought over
ten percent of Mexico's crude oil production for a number of years. Japanese
investment represents about six percent of all investment in Mexico. The big draw
in recent years has been the maquiladoras projects ....
More than thirty Japanese
companies have such operations.
Id. See also Eckhouse, Japan's Electronic Giants Use Mexico as the Back Door, 14 ELECTRONIC Bus. 22 (1988). "The maquiladoras help [Japan] (1) because the products count as
Mexican exports instead of Japanese, and (2) because they reduce the U.S. trade deficit with
Japan." Id.
27. Regulations of the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment, D.O., May 16, 1989, art. 16 [hereinafter Foreign Investment Regulations].
28. Tarbox, supra note 1, at 120.
29. Id. at 121.
30. Id. at 115. The exact industries reserved for the government are: "(1) petroleum and
other hydrocarbons, (2) basic petrochemicals, (3) exploitation of radioactive materials and generation of nuclear energy, (4) mining in cases covered by the law relating thereto, (5) electricity,
(6) railroads, (7) telegraphic and other wireless communications, and (8) other activities established in specific laws." Id. The industries reserved for Mexican citizens are: "(1) radio and
television, (2) urban and interurban automotive transportation and transportation of federal
highways, (3) domestic air and maritime transportation, (4) exploitation of forestry resources,
(5) gas distribution, and (6) other activities established in specific laws." Id.
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in principal, do not permit wholly-owned or majority-owned foreign
enterprises. For the most part, the restrictions deal only with cultural
items, national services or transportation, petroleum and petroleum
products, mining, and nuclear energy.
Maquiladoras are regulated by the Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development, known by its Spanish acronym "SECOFIN."' 31
Participation in export-oriented industry by a non-Mexican requires
registration with SECOFIN, but the paper-work necessary has been
reduced until, now, only one form is needed. A maquiladora - that
is, any business entity designed to use imports to produce exports 2
must declare itself as such when it registers with SECOFIN.3
Before registration, the foreign interest, or possibly a joint foreign
and Mexican interest, needs to settle upon a form for the enterprise.
There are primarily three ways for a foreign manufacturer to establish
a maquiladora on its own: (1) a wholly owned subsidiary, (2) subcontracting, or (3) a shelter program.3 The most common choice is the
wholly-owned Mexican subsidiary, which is almost always incorporated. 4 The "Sociedad Anonima" (S.A.) is attractive for many reasons:
The combination of limited liability, one hundred percent
ownership and management, and Mexican taxation of only
those retained earnings actually remitted as dividends makes
the S.A. a popular form for maquiladoras .... [When the
corporation is formed with a local partner] additional reasons,
such as minimization of risk and acquisition of the expertise,
associations or financial resources of a partner make this
form of ownership desirable. The involvement of a Mexican
partner is also looked upon favorably by the Mexican government and may induce governmental concessions and cooperation.s
Despite the popularity and advantages of a joint corporation, specific
investors may desire other business entities, such as branch opera-

31. The Spanish title of the department is "Secretariade Commercio y Fomento Industrial"
(SECOFIN). See Tarbox, supra note 1, at 122.
32. Foreign Investment Regulations, supra note 27, at art. 59.
33. Daniels, Bordering on Opportunity, 22 WORLD 3 (1988), at 4-5. The "shelter program"
is a situation where "the Mexican shelter company operates the assembly process and handles
all paper work and customs transactions. The foreign firm's managers and technical personnel
may merely supervise." Id. This approach works well for small or short term projects, which
can be accommodated by an existing Mexican plant with idle capacity. Id.
34. D. BAERRESEN, supra note 2, at 16-21.
35. Tarbox, supra note 1, at 118.
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tions, partnerships, or even a sole proprietorship. Mexico permits
them all, though tax and liability concerns make some forms poor
business choices.36
Even if there is a decision not to have Mexican investment in the
project, all commentators agree that there should be domestic professional assistance in setting up the enterprise. 7 First and foremost, all
maquiladoras require some degree of Mexican legal advice, and this
is best provided by a Mexican lawyer. Domestic assistance is also
helpful for accounting, tax planning, customs clearance, and general
contacts. The more knowledgeable an investor is in these areas, and
the more widespread his domestic contacts, then the greater are the
chances of a maquiladora's success.C.

United States' Law

Though the Mexican government deserves much of the credit for
the success of maquiladoras, no one doubts that the program would
not have prospered if the U.S. Customs laws were not structured as
they are. It is the policy of the United States to allow domestic manufacturers to ship certain components and materials abroad for assembly and incidental operations, and when the goods return to the U.S.
they pay no duty on the domestic content. Under the law, assembly
of the goods may occur anywhere - Canada, Asia, South America but Mexico is the country which particularly benefits from the policy.
The relevant part of the customs regulations is known as the
Schedule.3 It has been summarized thusly:

36. Id. at 116-19.
37. See, e.g., D. BAERRESEN, supra note 2, at 16-19; deForest, supra note 24, at 24-25.
38. The importance of local Mexican contact cannot be overemphasized. There are countless
details and characteristics to manufacturing and import-export; oversight of any one of these
details can prove to be extremely expensive. A Mexican advisor would be well aware of these
factors, but even the most competent U.S. advisor would miss them if he had no exposure to
such projects. Who, for instance, could be expected to know that Mexican truck drivers will
not load merchandise, and that usually Mexican carriers are not insured? See Hulbert,
Maquiladoras: Borderline Logistics in Mexico, DISTRIBUTION, Oct., 1987, at 50. Who also
would know that maquiladoras require two fire insurance policies; one in pesos to cover the
building and one in dollars to cover the imported machinery? See Beane, MaquiladorasPose
Special Problems, 19 BUSINESS INSURANCE 30 (1985).
39. 19 U.S.C. § 1202, Tariff Schedules of the United States, Schedule 8, Part 1-B, Items
800.00-807.00. The Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) are no longer published in the
U.S.C.A., because of their numerous amendments. Current versions of the Tariff Schedules are
published by the United States International Trade Commission under § 201 of the Tariff
Classification Act of 1962 (Pub. L. 87-456).
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The basic rule set forth in Schedule 8 is that articles imported
into the United States, whether or not originally produced
in the United States, and whether or not previously imported
and duty-paid, are dutiable on their full value in accordance
with the tariff schedules, unless there is some special provision for a full or partial exemption. Schedule 8 contains four
important exceptions to the basic rule that can be useful to
American producers who wish to have certain processes performed abroad. Since these are exceptions, they are strictly
construed and administered by the Customs Service. Strict
compliance is necessary with the customs regulations requiring the filing of forms incident to these exceptions. Failure
form may cause a denial of the benefit of
to file a required
40
the exception.

In recognition of the complexity involved in these matters, regulations accompany the statute and include sample forms and example
situations.41 Since importation usually involves significant sums of
money, it is extremely important to know exactly what duty will be
levied. Advisors point out two methods of clarifying any vague details.- First, importers should contact the District Director of Customs
at the intended port of entry, explain the specifics of their maquiladora
operation, and reach an understanding on what duty will be charged.
Next, if necessary, an importer may obtain a binding opinion from
the Commissioner of Customs' office. Depending upon the value of
the investment, importers may feel more comfortable with a binding
ruling, even though it requires more expense and time.
Schedule 8 contains four possible duty exceptions, yet maquiladoras
are affected primarily by one: Item 807.00.4 This provision explicitly
covers components which were shipped abroad only for assembly, and
have not increased in value except by being assembled. The components must be products of the United States, which the regulations
define as "article[s] manufactured within the Customs territory of the
United States and.

. .

consist[ing] wholly of United States components

40. Rossides, U.S. Import Trade Regulation, at 152 (1986).
41. Articles Assembled Abroad with United States Components, 19 C.F.R. §§ 10.1-.24
(4-1-88 Ed.).
42. Rossides, supra note 40, at 154-55.
43. The other three exceptions contained in the TSUS are: (1) Item 800.00, which covers
products not advanced in condition or improved in value while abroad (e.g., samples sent abroad,
rejected shipments, and prototype models); (2) Item 806.20, which covers products exported for
repairs or similar alterations; (3) Item 806.30, which covers articles of metal exported for further
processing. See Schedule 8, TSUS, supra note 39, at Items 800.00 806.30.
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or materials. "- Raw materials or other articles imported to the United
States (before being re-exported to a maquiladora plant) will be defined
as products of the U.S. if they undergo a manufacturing process such
that the foreign components or materials have been substantially transformed into a new and different article. 45 For example, articles imported from South Korea could become, for purposes of the statute,
products of the United States if they pass through a "substantial
transformation" here.
The regulation is designed for assembly abroad of U.S. components,
and assembly is defined as "any method used to join or fit together
solid components, such as welding, soldering, riveting, force fitting,
gluing, laminating, sewing, or the use of fasteners, and may be preceded, accompanied, or followed by -perations incidental to the assembly. ' ' 46 Mixing liquids, gases, chem: 'als, or foods is not within the
parameters of the definition. 47 Confus:on may arise over the "operations incidental" part of the regulation, and the code does not clearly
specify the phrase. Rather, the code gives examples of activities which
definitely are incidental operations - cleaning, testing, marking, calibrating, packing, etc. - and then applies the "substantial transformation" test; any activity which substantially transforms the product is
not an incidental operation.4 8The issue of incidental operations recently
became controversial, with some members of the U.S. Congress calling
for a program of maquiladora inspection, in order to ensure that foreign
goods do not slip in under Item 807.00. 49 While there is potential for
fraud in the maquiladora system, most observers have argued that
plant inspections are not the solution. Maquiladoras, they contend,
have succeeded precisely because they are free of onerous regulation
and inspection demands, and any new interference would make them
unprofitable.
When, as often happens, U.S. components are shipped to Mexico
and assembled, they may be joined with foreign components (that is,
components which are neither Mexican nor American). The resulting
product, when re-imported, will receive a tariff exception on its U.S.made parts. The code explains:

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

19
19
19
Id.
19

49.

See Mexico: U.S. Promotion of Plant Location Arouses Ire of Unions, Members of

C.F.R. § 10.12(e) (1988).
C.F.R. § 10.14(b) (1988).
C.F.R. § 10.16(a) (1988).
C.F.R. § 10.16(b), (c) (1988).

Congress, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1462 (1986) [hereinafter U.S. Promotion].
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A solid-state watch movement is assembled abroad from
foreign-made components and an American-made integrated
circuit. If the movement in question is subject to the specific
rate duty of 75 cents if the value of the assembled movement
is $30, and if the value of the American-made integrated
circuit is $10, then the value of the integrated circuit represents one third of the total value of the assembled article
and the duty on the assembled article will be reduced by
one third ($.25). Therefore, the duty on the assembled movement is 50 cents.5°
The key to obtaining the exception for the U.S. part, or for the
entire product, is adequate documentation. 51 The code is very specific
in the documentation required for Item 807.00.52 The code also requires
that any product claiming this tariff exception be specifically marked,
such as "Assembled in

from materials of U.S. origin."- De-

spite its importance, documentation may be waived upon certain
criteria and at the discretion of the District Director of Customs. 5
As mentioned earlier, these provisions are exceptions to the Tariff
Schedule, and so they are strictly construed. Any mistakes in documentation or registration are the ultimate responsibility of the importer,
and he is subject to civil and criminal sanctions for mistaken, false,
or fraudulent entries.- If an importer disagrees with any decision of
the Customs Service, he may file suit. Unfortunately for the importer,
though, Congress has specifically provided that decisions of the Service
on Schedule 8 are presumed to be correct and the burden of proof is
upon the party claiming otherwise.6 Federal courts therefore
are re57
area.
this
in
rulings
Service
Customs
luctant to overturn
D.

Ramifications

Any governmental plan, when encountered on a scale as large as
that of the maquiladora system, will create a multitude of reactions,
some intended and some unexpected, some beneficial and some detri-

50. 19 C.F.R. § 10.13 (1988), example 2.
51. Rossides, supra note 40, at 158.
52. 19 C.F.R. § 10.24 (1988).
53. Rossides, supra note 40, at 158.
54. 19 C.F.R. § 10.24(e) (1988).
55. 19 C.F.R. § 10.24(g) (1988).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) (1988).
57. For a recent case demonstrating this reluctance, see Nassau Smelting & Refining Co.
v. United States, 725 F. Supp. 544 (CIT 1989).
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mental. Mexico's in-bond industry is no exception. Partially, the program has achieved its intended goals and thereby won advocates. Yet
it also must be admitted that the program has failed in certain respects,
which lends credence to its critics. In each case, the link between the
effect cited and maquiladoras as a cause is difficult to establish; perhaps
maquiladoras caused the result, and perhaps not. Perhaps
maquiladoras are only partially responsible. Before evaluating the potential for maquiladoras in any new region, one should recognize these
factors which give ammunition to both critics and advocates.
1. Drawbacks to the Maquiladora System
The most profound impact of maquiladoras, far beyond any other,
is that which it has had upon the demographics of the Mexican population.5 In this century, Mexico's population has grown at a phenomenal rate. 59 Maquiladoras didn't cause the growth, but they greatly
influenced where people chose to live. Mexicans, like other peoples,
tend to leave economically depressed areas, and to move where jobs
are found. To a large extent that has meant northern Mexico, along
the U.S. border; this is where eighty percent of the maquiladoras are
locatedA0 True, there was overcrowding, congestion, and unemployment in northern Mexico before maquiladoras (especially just after
cancellation of the Bracero Program). Yet the demands posed by a
thriving maquiladora program have overwhelmed the existing infrastructure.6 1 Mexico has attempted to improve the area, but so far the
flood of humanity has meant congestion and pollution.62
Another problem, directly' related to the population problem, is
that of illegal immigration. As successful as maquiladoras are, they
still cannot provide a job for everyone who wants one. Many Mexicans,
having come to the border from the south in search of jobs, simply
will continue heading north if they don't find employment in Mexico.Often, the men in a family will emigrate from Mexico to the United

58. Shaffer, An Alternative to Unilateral Immigration Controls: Toward a Coordinated
U.S. - Mexico Binational Approach, 41 STAN. L. REV. 187 (1988).
59. See S. SANDERS, supra note 3.
60. Baker, The Magnet of Growth in Mexico's North, Bus. WK. (Industrial/Technology
Edition), June 6, 1988, at 48-50.
61. Shaffer, supra note 58, at 222.
62. See id. A discussion of the environmental problems caused by the border industries
easily would justify a paper of its own. The topic is very complex and in many respects resembles
the controversy over acid rain (i.e., activities in one country create pollution, but the effects
are felt in another country).
63. Shaffer, supra note 58, at 192.
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States illegally, while the women will stay in Mexico and work in a
maquiladora plant;64 after a few years of working and saving money,
the men usually return.' The attraction of an American job - legal
or illegal - exists even for those with jobs in maquiladora plants, so
great is the difference in pay scale between the two nations.6
Maquiladoras, therefore do seem to contribute to illegal immigration,
as ironic as that may be (they were, after all, created in part to help
curb illegal immigration).
A charge sometimes levied by Mexican critics of the program is
that it provides a framework for American corporations to take advantage of Mexican workers. For the same tasks, Mexican workers earn
far less than their American counterparts.6 7 Some critics claim that
U.S. corporations send operations to Mexico that are especially hazardous or unhealthy, and that the corporations apply a double-standard
for safety procedures (providing only the bare minimum in Mexico,
which is far below that for the same job in the U.S.).On the other hand, American labor - particularly organized labor
- opposes maquiladoras. To American unions, maquiladoras represent
a threat to job security and high wage rates. Union economists claim
that for every 2.5 jobs created in Mexico under the program, one
U.S. job is lost. 69 Unions are especially fierce in their opposition because it is the older, traditionally unionized industries that are best
suited to maquiladoras.70 There is some basis for the union fears,
especially when one realizes how much money a company saves per
employee if a job is located in Mexico instead of the U. S.71 All American
64. Rivera-Batiz, Can Border Industries be a Substitute for Immigration?, 76 AM. ECON.
REV. 263, 263-68, (1986). The situation with immigration is part of the reason why the vast
majority of maquiladora workers are women, but there are other causes as well. Maquiladora
managers prefer women as employees; they feel that women are more productive, less error
prone, and less likely to be absent from work. Another factor is the prevalence among Mexican
males of the view that small-parts assembly is not a man's job. See Stratton, Learning the
Language Is Not Enough, 22 QUALITY PROGRESS 16 (1989).
65. Shaffer, supra note 58, at 191-204.
66. Rivera-Batiz, supra note 64, at 263; "maquiladoras offer wage rates 5%-30% above the
Mexican official minimum wage rates [real wages are far below the official minimum wage].
However, illegal migrants can earn 800%-1,300% above the Mexican rate in the U.S."
67. deForest, supra note 24.
68. See U.S. Promotion, supra note 49, at 1463-67.
69. Id.
70. Organized Labor Urges Bush Administration to Take Tougher International Trade
Stance, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 266, at 266-67 (1989). It is not only American organized labor
which opposes maquiladoras; they are resented in Canada as well. See CanadianLabor Group
Plans Attack on Implementation of Free Trade Deal, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 155 (1989).
71. See Daniels, supra note 33 (a company can save an average of $18,500 per employee
by putting a plant in Mexico rather than the U.S.)
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labor, however, dislikes the idea of U.S. companies investing capital
and resources abroad rather than at home. One study of the subject
summed up its findings this way: "Historians may record that
maquiladoras made Mexico culturally more like the U.S., but by pulling
firms out of the U.S., they also made the U.S. economically more like
Mexico." 72
Lastly, and unlike some of the other charges, this one is taken
very seriously by the Mexican government; critics argue that U.S.
companies have no intention of placing advanced technology in
Mexico. 73 Corporations, the argument runs, have a direct interest in
keeping Mexican labor inexpensive. This objective can be assured by
keeping Mexican labor at the low end of technological development.
Even if companies desired to place high technology in Mexico, they
would have difficulty finding enough educated workers. Instead, corporations are satisfied with the system as it stands. The intention to
keep maquiladoras strictly low-tech, critics claim, is seen in the recent
surge of automation in the plants74
2.

Advantages of the Maquiladora System

Those who advocate the maquiladora system of business generally
do not deny that there are some problems. To critics in both Mexico
and the United States, they respond that, while problems exist, there
are other factors which also deserve consideration.
First, they argue, comparison of Mexican workers with American
workers is not a fair equation. Instead, Mexican workers in
maquiladoras should be compared with Mexican workers outside of
the system. Under those terms, maquiladora workers fair well. Their
pay is higher and their benefits are much better than the average
Mexican worker.7 5 Also, maquiladoras are not necessarily more dangerous than any other business; it just depends on the industry, and some
industries are inherently dangerous.76
Secondly, rather than view maquiladoras as a source of problems,
perhaps critics should view them as a means of mitigating problems.
In other words, maquiladoras haven't taken jobs and investment away

72. Mirowski & Helper, Maquiladoras:Mexico's Tiger By the Tail?, CHALLENGE, May,
1989, at 30.
73. See Tarbox, supra note 1.
74. Tiersten, Robots In Mexico?, 14 ELECTRONIC Bus. 110 (1988).
75. deForest, supra note 24. See also, Tarbox, supra note 1.
76. Salinas, The Maquiladorasof Mexico: An Effort to Understand the Controversy, 5 Sw.
J. Bus. & ECON. 18 (1987).
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from the United States; the industries were leaving America in order
to remain profitable, no matter what happened. 77 Through
maquiladoras, however, at least some American jobs were preserved.
The same may be said for illegal immigration.7 How many Mexicans
would wish to come to the U.S. if maquiladoras did not exist, and
even more were unemployed? Thus, when criticizing the existing arrangements, it is important to ask if the situation would be any better
if maquiladoras did not exist. Whenever the answer to that query is
"no," it appears that the system is not inherently at fault, and is
either not the cause of the problems or only one of many contributing
factors.
Economically, maquiladoras have been a success. They created jobs
in Mexico, and they attracted capital and technology.9 Maquiladoras
have generated billions of dollars in foreign exchange for Mexico. This
foreign exchange, in turn, enables Mexico to maintain its debt to the
U.S. government and to U.S. banks.8° Without the foreign exchange
that maquiladoras create, Mexico almost surely would default on its
loans, and that would be disastrous for both Mexico and the United
States. Yet maquiladoras have done more than simply avert harm;
they have created wealth, particularly in the southwestern United
States. Some analysts have theorized that if the maquiladora program
were to end, it would cost over 100,000 American jobs in the Southwest. 81
Finally, there is the aspect of foreign relations. Maquiladoras are
one of the best examples of international economic cooperation. 82 They
provide a framework within which all parties benefit. The United
States provided Mexico with jobs, capital, infrastructure, and technology, and they were provided at a time when oil prices (Mexico's
primary source of foreign exchange) had fallen sharply.- In return,
the United States was able to preserve some jobs and to create others.
Additionally, we contributed to the welfare of a nation whose future
is inextricably linked with our own. Certainly, the healthier the Mex-

77. Daniels, supra note 33, at 4.
78. Shaffer, supra note 58, at 205-6.
79. Valdez, Expanding the Concept of Coproduction Beyond the Maquiladora:Toward a
More Effective PartnershipBetween the United States and Mexico, and the CaribbeanBasin
Countries 22 INT'L LAW. 393, at 397-402, (1988).
80. Id.
81. Kolbe, U.S.-Mexico Relations: Building a Golden Age, 6 ECON. DEv. REV. 14, at
15-17, (1988).
82. Valdez, supra note 79.
83. Id.
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ican economy is, then the more politically stable our southern neighbor
will be. All in all, the maquiladora program has become one of the
most important elements in the U.S.-Mexico relationship; and the
majority opinion on both sides is that it is a positive element.
III.

YUCATAN

A.

Generally

The Yucatan Peninsula, geographically, is the northeast projection
of Central America which separates the Gulf of Mexico from the
Caribbean Sea. Contained within the peninsula are the Mexican states
of Campeche and Yucatan, the territory of Quintana Roo, plus large
parts of Honduras, Belize, and Guatemala. The state capital of Yucatan, Merida, is the commercial center of the area, and also serves as
a tourist base for the nearby Maya ruins. A seaport, Progreso, is on
the Gulf of'Mexico, twenty-four miles from Merida, and is the commercial point of entry for the Yucatan.
The Yucatan Peninsula was conquered by the Spanish in 1546,
after nineteen years of struggle. Originally the Spaniards made slave
raids on the Yucatan from their stronghold in Cuba. Once they conquered the territory, the Spanish treated the native inhabitants no
better. While no one knows the exact population prior to the Spanish,
fewer than 300,000 Mayans survived the conquest. By 1700, the
Spanish, small-pox, and social disorganization had reduced even that
number by half.The historical friction between the Spaniards and the native inhabitants is important because remnants of it continue to the present day.
The two groups involved are described as: "[the] Ladinos were those
of Spanish or half-Spanish descent who considered themselves "white"
and lived, dressed, and thought according to a European heritage;
they lived apart from the native Maya, or Indios." Today, most of
the rural inhabitants of the Yucatan are Maya, and speak little Spanish.
Yucatan became a Mexican state in 1824. In 1902, the territory of
Quintana Roo was sliced off, and in 1917 Campeche was separated.
Throughout its history, the Yucatan has been reluctant to yield to the
authority of Mexico City. Yucatan seceded from Mexico in 1839, and
kept its independence until 1843. In 1847 another revolt followed, and
the Mayans were practically independent throughout most of the region until 1877. In 1910 there was a final revolt, which was put down.

84.

N.

85.

Id. at 5.

REED, THE CASTE WAR OF YUCATAN
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All these revolutions were armed conflicts, and for the most part were
extremely bloody.
Until the twentieth century, the Yucatan Peninsula was more
closely connected with Europe and the United States than with the
rest of Mexico. There was no railway linking the peninsula with the
rest of the country until 1949, and not until 1957 was that narrow
gauge line widened to the standard width, allowing the movement of
heavy freight.8 7 The Yucatan traditionally was self-sufficient because
of its flourishing henequen industry, but as henequen fiber became
replaced by man-made fibers, the industry has mostly collapsed.
As a result of its discord and contention with Mexico City, the
Yucatan Peninsula really is as much a part of Central America and
the Caribbean as it is of Mexico. The area's population is comprised
of the same elements as the rest of Central America and the Caribbean,
namely African, Mayan, and mestizo.8 As in the rest of the region,
a tension is present between the Ladinos, or those of European descent, and the Indios or mestizos. Most importantly, the Yucatan has
faced the same problems of economic underdevelopment as have Central America and the Caribbean. As a laboratory for economic change,
no part of Mexico is better suited than the Yucatan, because in no
other part of Mexico will the lessons learned be as easily transferable.
This factor makes the future of maquiladoras in the Yucatan important
for the entire hemisphere.
B.

Steps to Establish a Yucatan Maquiladora

Recognizing the success of maquiladora projects in the northern
part of the country, the Mexican government embarked upon a program of actively encouraging maquiladora expansion.1 The State of
the Yucatan is one of the targeted regions. Officially, the Yucatan
has been open to maquiladoras for more than a decade, but while a
few concerns have located plants in the state, there has been no
widespread interest.- Foreign companies are hesitant to locate in the
Yucatan for the same reasons that they are hesitant to locate in any
underdeveloped region; the area lacks the infrastructure, education,

86. Id. at 270-80.
87. Id. at 34.
88. Id. at 113.
89. Baker & Vogel, Will the New Maquiladoras Build a Better Manana?, Bus. WK.
(Industrial/Technology Ed.), Nov. 14, 1988, at 102.
90. Dibble, Cheap Labor Makes Good: Yucatan Lures Florida Firms, Miami Herald, Sept.
5, 1988, at 17, col. 1.
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and investment required to support industry. Industry, however, is
precisely the sector which can provide an underdeveloped region with
infrastructure and investment. All in all, it can be something of a
vicious cycle. Yet the Mexican government, under both the current
and previous presidential administrations,91 claims that it is determined
to break the cycle in the Yucatan. Giving substance to its rhetoric,
Mexico City has committed financial resources and changed several
important laws.First, and importantly, Mexico City released some of its centralized
authority to the region. Federal level decisions that once could be
made only in the capital may now be made by regional offices. SECOFIN is one of the agencies affected by the change. 93 SECOFIN
handles the permit applications for maquiladoras; permits for a Yucatan maquiladora are now handled in the Yucatan, which means only
a four or five week wait.- If permit applications were to go to Mexico
City, much more time would be needed. Also, the regionalization of
authority is important for what it symbolizes. As noted earlier, there
is a history of discord between the Yucatan and the capital. By conceding some of its power, Mexico City acknowledges that the economic
future of the Yucatan must be determined in the Yucatan, and that
it will not hamper growth.
The federal government also committed itself to spending millions
towards improving the region's infrastructure. These funds are directed in the two most crucial areas: transportation and industry-ready
location. For the second, the state of Yucatan built two new industrial
parks: the 495-acre Yucatan Industrial Park just outside the capital
city of Merida, and the 220-acre Poligono Industrial Park, which is
located between Merida and the port of Progreso. 5 In northern
Mexico, U.S. investors have shown an affinity for locating in industrial
parks, and Yucatan officials are hoping to reproduce that environment.
Certainly, a business is more likely to open a new facility if an industrial park already exists than if it must build the park itself.
The second area for expenditure is the improvement of transportation facilities. In the earlier discussion of the maquiladora system, it
was noted that adequate transportation is absolutely essential for the

91.
92.
to U.S.,
93.
94.
95.

Baker & Vogel, supra note 89.
Mexico: Yucatan State Announces Plan to EncourageIn Bond Plants, Citing Proximity
3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1087 (1986) [hereinafter Yucatan State Announces Plan].
See Secretaria de Commercio y Fomento Industrial (SECOFIN), supra note 31.
Yucatan State Announces Plan, supra note 92, at 1087.
Id. at 1090.
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program to succeed. Businesses must be able to get their unassembled
components into, and assembled products out of, Mexico as quickly
and inexpensively as possible. If ever the cost of transportation cost in dollars or cost in time - rises to a level that overcomes profit,
then the maquiladora will soon cease to function. The Yucatan is trying
to make its transportation facilities efficient and modern enough to
leave a margin for profit. The government spent close to $30 million
on improvements for the port of Progreso. 96 They dredged the harbor
so that it can accommodate ships weighing up to 20,000 tons,
lengthened the harbor for even larger ships, and planned to add container shipping facilities.- There are also plans to improve air transportation, which until now has been risky and expensive for businesses
in the Yucatan. 98
Finally, the government is spending $1.5 million to publicize the
region as receptive to maquiladoras.- They are anxious for potential
investors to know that the Yucatan will accommodate them as far as
it is able. Ministers from SECOFIN have visited the United States,
and Florida in particular, to advertise the region, its traditional work
ethic, and its plans for the future. 1°0
IV.

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF A YUCATAN MAQUILADORA

In light of government hopes for the region, how would an actual
maquiladora plant in the Yucatan fare? While, certainly, no one knows
for sure, there is consensus opinion held by those who have analyzed
the subject. The majority diagnosis is that the Yucatan has many
factors in its favor and that some day U.S. manufacturers in the region
will prosper, Rt that day is not here yet, and few believe that it will
come in this century. 01 1 Of course, this could change rapidly if there
was a sudden and large infusion of capital into the Yucatan, but if all

96. Id.
97. Id. See also, Dibble, supra note 90.
98. Despite the risk and expense, the few maquiladoras in the Yucatan have had to rely
on air transportation to move their products. As a result of this dependency on poor air facilities,
at least one U.S. backed maquiladora in the Yucatan has folded. See Dibble, supra note 90.
99. Dibble, supra note 90; see also Yucatan State Announces Plan, supra note 92.
100. Dibble, supra note 90.
101. Telephone interview with Judy Babbet, Flagstaff Institute (Oct. 14, 1989). The
Flagstaff Institute specializes in the study of economic issues affecting the southwestern U.S.
and Mexico. On the staff is an expert on the subject of Yucatan business, Richard Bolin.
Unfortunately, Mr. Bolin was out of the country while this research was conducted. Miss Babbet
is Mr. Bolin's assistant.
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factors remain constant, analysts doubt that maquiladoras will exist
on a large scale.
In its favor, the Yucatan is working to capitalize upon its resources
and its people. The Yucatan's population is a very attractive resource.
While all Mexican labor has the advantage of being inexpensive, the
maquiladoras in the north are plagued by problems of poor quality
work, high absenteeism, and extremely high worker turnover rates.'°2
Workers in the Yucatan, however, are known for their stability, industriousness, and high quality; they also have extremely low absenteeism. 103 Conjecture among commentators is that this work ethic and
entrepreneurial spirit stems from the Yucatan's history of skilled industry (the henequen industry), and tradition of isolation from the
rest of Mexico (that is, the region had to create trade outside of
Mexico).-' There were times in history when the Yucatan had large
volumes of trade with the U.S., 0 5 so the region has import/export
experience.
Another consideration, and one which is very important to the
U.S. government, is that a maquiladora system in the Yucatan would
not add to the illegal immigration problem. As seen (in part II, section
D), the industry zone in northern Mexico is attributed with luring
workers to the border. Then, if they cannot find employment, they
simply continue heading north into the U.S. The Yucatan, in the
southeastern-most part of Mexico, presents no such threat; it could
not become a launching pad for illegal immigration. 1 6 Also, a healthy
economy in Yucatan would give unemployed workers throughout
Mexico somewhere other than the border to look for employment.
A third factor in the Yucatan's favor is its location. From the port
of Progreso, it is a relatively short journey for a cargo ship to New
Orleans, Tampa, or Miami. From any of these ports, Yucatan
maquiladoras would have access to the U.S. Interstate system, which
in turn opens the entire Southeast and Eastern seaboard to truck
transportation. 0 7 Recognition of this potential is the motivation behind
the Mexican plans to add container shipping facilities to Progreso.1° 8
Trucking, and the U.S. Interstate network in the Southwest, have

102. deForest, supra note 24.
103. Yucatan State Announces Plan, supra note 92, at 1090.
104. Dibble, supra note 90.
105. Id.
106. Babbet, supra note 101.
107. Dibble, supra note 90. See also Yucatan State Announces Plan, supra note 92.
108. Telephone interview with John Thorington, Director of Marketing & Trade Development, Port of Tampa, Port Authority (Nov. 2, 1989).
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been one of the main reasons for the success of maquiladoras on the
border. 10 9 Yucatan hopes to duplicate this transportation network
throughout the Southeastern U.S., once it is able to handle container
shipping.
Finally, maquiladoras may one day thrive in the Yucatan simply
because that would be in the interests of Mexico and the United
States. The Mexican government's interest is readily apparent; it needs
development in the Yucatan for economic reasons. A strong Mexican
economy is also in U.S. economic interest, but the U.S. has other
considerations, to be specific, political considerations. With most of
Central America -

particularly Nicaragua and El Salvador -

in polit-

ical turmoil, a prosperous Yucatan would present a buffer of stability.
U.S. officials have long feared the notion of revolution or social chaos
in Mexico.",' Large amounts of U.S. investment in the Yucatan could
help prevent the troubles of Nicaragua and El Salvador from creeping
northward. Some analysts believe that this consideration alone should
make the U.S. government encourage corporations to invest in the
Yucatan. "'

All of the factors above are reasons why maquiladoras should be
successful in the future. For the present, Yucatan simply is not prepared to support much industry. There are no inherently insurmountable problems preventing development in the Yucatan. All of the obstacles can be overcome with time, effort, and capital. The Yucatan,
however, must improve two particular areas before it can attract most
U.S. corporations.
First, the Yucatan needs to further modernize its infrastructure.
Companies presently located in the state have three major complaints:
roads, water, and communications. Better roads are necessary for fast
and large scale transportation throughout the territory, especially between the industrial parks and the port of Progreso.112 As this discussion has repeatedly emphasized, the economics of transportation will
literally make or break a maquiladora operation. This need for inexpensive transportation is just as important within a country as between
countries; it is useless to inexpensively transport products to the Yucatan if they will only sit on the dock. The second complaint, lack of
adequate fresh water historically has been a problem in the Yucatan

109.
110.

111.
112.

Baker & Vogel, supra note 89.
See S. SANDERS, supra note 3.
Babbet, supra note 101.
Dibble, supra note 90.
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Peninsula, even as far back as the Mayans. 113 Due to its unique geological structure, wells are usually expensive to drill in the Yucatan. Yet
if American investment, or Americans themselves, are to be present
in the Yucatan, then the water must be sanitary and plentiful. Lastly,
there is the complaint about communications.114 To appreciate the
depth of this problem, one must remember that the typical maquiladora
is a branch of an American corporation; operational decisions are made
in the U.S., and management is predominantly American. The assembly plant, therefore, needs to maintain communications with its headquarters. Any delays in communication will increase operating expenses and reduce profits. Therefore, the more modern Yucatan telecommunications are, the more profitable an assembly plant will be.
In addition to modernizing the Yucatan's infrastructure, more work
must be done on its port and air facilities. While some improvements
were already made, they are not enough. Some observers charged
that improvements are mostly cosmetic, and the changes which are
not cosmetic are actually intended to increase tourism, not
maquiladoras. 115 Presently, the port of Progreso is not efficient enough
for most industries, and the air facilities alone cannot support even
the maquiladoras in Yucatan. Although container shipping facilities
will be installed, it will not happen on a large scale. The harbor was
dredged, but only to make it wider, not deeper (as large ships would
require).116 No matter how advanced the infrastructure of the Yucatan
becomes, and no matter what regulations the government changes, if
Progreso's port facilities are not developed, maquiladoran investment
will not be attracted.
The summary, then, of prospects for Yucatan maquiladoras is relatively straightforward; Yucatan is not where it wants to be, but it
is heading in the right direction. The Mexican government is doing
the right things, but not to the extent necessary. Clearly, Mexico
must work with limited resources. Yet currently they are on a course
of only paying a portion of development's price, and if the full price

113. Reed, supra note 84. Rainfall in the Yucatan, says Reed, quickly seeps through the
fifty to one hundred feet of limestone to the water table, where it is carried off by an underground
drainage system. Id. In earlier days, the only dependable supply of water was found in certain
caves, which were deep enough to reach the water table, or in sinkholes. Id. Reed argues that
until the twentieth century, "[w]hoever controlled the water controlled the country."Id.
114. Dibble, supra note 90.
115. Thorington, supra note 108.
116. Id. Mr. Thorington explains that even though the port was dredged to accommodate
ships of up to 20,000 tons, it cannot handle ships which draw more than twenty feet. Unless a
port wishes to service only barges, depth is at least as important as tonnage.
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is not paid, they will have neither development nor the money spent.
While even the sharpest critics admit that the government is serious
about encouraging maquiladoras in the Yucatan, it is unlikely that the
plans will experience much success in this century.
L. Gray Sanders
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